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author | Tristan F <LeoDog896@hotmail.com> | 2023-04-24 07:03:53 -0400 |
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committer | GitHub <noreply@github.com> | 2023-04-24 13:03:53 +0200 |
commit | 652694f15d79851bcb02640f18c204efcbd04d17 (patch) | |
tree | 9d9344fe726a8e1ed60029c58e8b26899b65f56b | |
parent | 1f0360c07382dbd86066d1aa8aa4bae34aff18c5 (diff) |
docs(security): clarify storage explosion attacks in policy (#18697)
Deno does not cover storage explosion attacks from evaluated runtime
code.
I've chosen the following parts for this clarification:
- _Evaluated_ code - storage explosion attacks caused by services in
Deno such as the HTTP server should still be covered.
- Isolated - If the storage explosion attack can happen at arbitrary
different files, it may leave a much more lasting impact on a targeted
host system than on simply the Deno cache.
-rw-r--r-- | .github/SECURITY.md | 4 |
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.github/SECURITY.md b/.github/SECURITY.md index c5680b2b0..ea7a0af3d 100644 --- a/.github/SECURITY.md +++ b/.github/SECURITY.md @@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ may change slightly over time, but in general the model is as follows: that a value set in one web worker can not be accessed by another. - All runtime I/O is considered to be privileged and must always be guarded by a runtime permission. This includes filesystem access, network access, etc. + - The only exception to this is runtime storage explosion attacks that are + isolated to a part of the file system, caused by evaluated code (for + example, caching big dependencies or no limits on runtime caches such as the + [Web Cache](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Cache) API). - Users should not be able to self-escalate their permissions without explicit consent. - I/O required to build an initial static module graph should always follow the |