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authorTristan F <LeoDog896@hotmail.com>2023-04-24 07:03:53 -0400
committerGitHub <noreply@github.com>2023-04-24 13:03:53 +0200
commit652694f15d79851bcb02640f18c204efcbd04d17 (patch)
tree9d9344fe726a8e1ed60029c58e8b26899b65f56b
parent1f0360c07382dbd86066d1aa8aa4bae34aff18c5 (diff)
docs(security): clarify storage explosion attacks in policy (#18697)
Deno does not cover storage explosion attacks from evaluated runtime code. I've chosen the following parts for this clarification: - _Evaluated_ code - storage explosion attacks caused by services in Deno such as the HTTP server should still be covered. - Isolated - If the storage explosion attack can happen at arbitrary different files, it may leave a much more lasting impact on a targeted host system than on simply the Deno cache.
-rw-r--r--.github/SECURITY.md4
1 files changed, 4 insertions, 0 deletions
diff --git a/.github/SECURITY.md b/.github/SECURITY.md
index c5680b2b0..ea7a0af3d 100644
--- a/.github/SECURITY.md
+++ b/.github/SECURITY.md
@@ -48,6 +48,10 @@ may change slightly over time, but in general the model is as follows:
that a value set in one web worker can not be accessed by another.
- All runtime I/O is considered to be privileged and must always be guarded by a
runtime permission. This includes filesystem access, network access, etc.
+ - The only exception to this is runtime storage explosion attacks that are
+ isolated to a part of the file system, caused by evaluated code (for
+ example, caching big dependencies or no limits on runtime caches such as the
+ [Web Cache](https://developer.mozilla.org/en-US/docs/Web/API/Cache) API).
- Users should not be able to self-escalate their permissions without explicit
consent.
- I/O required to build an initial static module graph should always follow the